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Abstract
We analyze the adversarial examples problem in terms of a model’s fault tolerance
with respect to its input. Whereas previous work focuses on arbitrarily strict threat
models, i.e., -perturbations, we consider arbitrary valid inputs and propose an
information-based characteristic for evaluating tolerance to diverse input faults.1
1 Introduction
Fault tolerance is a qualitative term that refers to the ability of a system to perform within specification
despite faults in its subsystems. A way of characterizing a complex system’s fault tolerance is to
measure its performance under induced faults of varying strength. In particular for systems operating
in safety-critical settings [21], it is desirable that the performance degrades gradually as a function of
fault severity and consistently so across a variety of fault types.
Most of the literature on the fault tolerance of artificial neural networks considers internal faults, such
as deliberate [12, 29] or accidental [25, 20, 31] neuron outage. Modern deep networks, however, are
presented with increasingly complex data, and many applications demand predictable performance for
all inputs, e.g., low-confidence outputs for out-of-distribution inputs. Therefore, characterizing the
fault tolerance of the overall system requires considering the input itself as a source of external
faults [5, 34]. We suggest that the adversarial examples phenomenon, which exposes unstable model
behaviour for valid bounded inputs [30, 16, 19, 4, 2, 1], be interpreted as a type of external fault.
As a measure of a model’s tolerance to adversarial attacks of increasing strength, we propose the
information conveyed about the target variable, i.e., the label in a classification task [26, 32]. We find
this measure to be more representative of a model’s expected robustness than a previous convention
of reporting the test error rate for fixed -perturbations.2 The proposed characteristic curves reduce
the need for human supervision to distinguish mistakes from ambiguous instances [28, 3], which is
subjective and time consuming.
We expose a convolutional network to a range of different attacks and observe that: i) the proposed
robustness measure is sensitive to hyper-parameters such as weight decay, ii) prediction accuracies
may be identical, while the information curves differ, and iii) more gradual changes in the information
conveyed by the model prediction corresponds to improved adversarial robustness.
1Source available at https://github.com/uoguelph-mlrg/nips18-secml-advex-input-fault
2For demonstrations as to how the latter approach can be incomplete c.f. [27, 9, 24, 10, 35].
NIPS 2018 Workshop on Security in Machine Learning, Montréal, Canada.
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Figure 1: Motivating input-fault tolerance in terms of information conveyed about the original label
when models are subject to attacks with different objectives. Model (a) was trained with weight decay,
and (b) without. We report I(T ;Y ) (solid line) and prediction accuracy (dashed line) for a randomly
selected subset of 1000 images from the SVHN test set as a function of the SNR in dB for a BIM-L2
attack with three different misclassification objectives (details provided in the main text), and AWGN
for comparison. Note that for model (b) gradients vanish before zero SNR can be reached.
2 Methodology
We introduce a way of quantifying input-fault tolerance for arbitrary inputs in terms of the mutual
information (MI), I(T ;Y ), between a model’s categorical prediction and the true label, represented
by the random variables that T and Y , respectively. The MI can be written as I(T ;Y ) = H(Y )−
H(Y |T ), where H denotes the Shannon entropy in bits, which is a measure of uncertainty. Perfect
predictive performance is achieved when H(Y |T ) = 0, i.e., when there is no uncertainty about Y
given the model’s prediction T . The upper bound on I(T ;Y ) is given by H(Y ), which is 3.2 bits for
the full (unbalanced) street-view house numbers (SVHN) [15] test set. We use a random sample of
1000 images from this set for our analysis.
For perturbation-based attacks, we plot MI versus the input signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), defined as
20 log10
(
1 + ‖x‖2/‖δx‖2
)
in dB, for test inputs x, and noise δx. The noise may be correlated with Y
(adversarial perturbations) or uncorrelated (AWGN). For vector field-based deformations [1], the
maximum norm of the vector field is used as a measure of perturbation strength instead, as it is less
clear how to standardize to SNR in this case. However, the choice of units on the x-axis is not critical
for the current analysis.
Datasets must be prepared identically for model comparison. We suggest using the zero-mean and
unit-variance standard, which we implement with per-image mean subtraction, after converting SVHN
images from RGB to greyscale via the National Television System Committee (NTSC) conversion.
Note that input signals with a non-zero mean, or DC bias, translate the curves along the SNR axis if
not removed; we provide additional reasons for preprocessing in Appendix A.
We subject the model to a broad array of faults: AWGN [6, 5], rotations and translations [8], a basic
iterative method “BIM” (L2 and L∞ variants) [13], “rubbish” or “fooling” images [11, 16], and
deformations “ADef” [1]. This variety reflects real inputs that span a continuous range of signal
quality, and exposes defenses that mask gradients [18, 2], or fit a specific set of inputs, e.g., a fixed
− L∞ box.
3 Evaluation
We begin by demonstrating why it is desirable to examine adversarial attacks from the perspective of
the information in the predictions rather than solely evaluating prediction accuracy. Figure 1 shows
characteristic curves for two pre-trained models subject to BIM-L2 attacks with different adversarial
objectives: misclassification “miscls”,which aims to make the prediction not Y , and two targeted
attack variants, “one-tgt”, which maps each class label to a particular target label (we use the shift
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Figure 2: Adversarial examples classified with full confidence 100% that were initialized from white
noise. Each of the respective digits are clearly visible in (a) for the more fault tolerant model (trained
with weight decay), while only some digits are faintly visible in (b). Results for more SNR values are
in Appendix D.
0→ 1, 1→ 2, . . . , 9→ 0), and “all-tgt”, mapping each original label to each possible incorrect label.
For comparison, we also show an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) perturbation.
The initial I(T ;Y ) values for the clean test set are approximately 2.50 and 2.75 bits, corresponding to
prediction accuracies of 90% and 94% for the model trained with weight decay 1(a) and without 1(b),
respectively. AWGN is the best-tolerated perturbation, as can be seen from the extended plateau until
very low SNR. Furthermore, it is the only one for which I(T ;Y ) reduces to zero along with the test
accuracy. In general, I(T ;Y ) declines initially as the introduced perturbations cause mistakes in the
model’s prediction, but it remains non-zero and behaves distinctly for the three adversarial objectives.
For instance, consider the “one-tgt” case: With increasing perturbation strength the model maps
inputs to the target label more consistently. The minimum of this curve marks the transition point at
which the perturbed input resembles the target class more closely than its original class. Additional
perturbations further refine the input, such that the MI keeps increasing and reaches the upper bound
I(T ;Y ) = H(Y ). That is, we observe perfect information transmission despite zero predictive
accuracy, indicating that the model’s predictions are in fact correct – the input has been changed to an
extent that it is a legitimate member of the target class.
A similar effect occurs for the simpler misclassification case “miscls”, where in Figure 1(a) we
observe a slow increase in I(T ;Y ) for SNR ≤ 20, indicating that from this point on additional
perturbations systematically add structure to the input. For the case where each wrong label is
targeted “all-tgt”, the MI vanishes at the point of complete confusion, i.e., when the inputs are
perturbed to the extent that H(Y |T ) = H(Y ), implying that the probability distribution p(Y |T ) is
uniform. Additional perturbations beyond this point reduce the probability of the original class to
zero, thus causing an “overshoot” effect where I(T ;Y ) increases to approximately 0.2 bits, a final
saturation value that is independent of the model.
In general, note that targeted attacks require more degradation of the input than a misclassifica-
tion attack to achieve a desired performance drop; this is reflected in the relative positions of the
corresponding curves.
Next, we compare the characteristic MI curves and relate them to model robustness for the case with
weight decay, and a baseline without. For the model with weight decay, presented in Figure 1(a),
I(T ;Y ) is initially slightly lower, but both the decrease and increase in I(T ;Y ) for the “one-tgt”
attack are more gradual than the baseline in Figure 1(b). Furthermore, the gap between the initial and
minimum value is smaller in Figure 1(a) (approximately 0.50 vs. 0.75 bits).
To further connect the gradual degradation property with qualitatively improved robustness to
adversarial examples, we use the BIM-L2 method to craft “fooling images” [16] for each of the two
models, which are shown in Figure 2. Starting from noise drawn from a Gaussian distribution with
σ = 0.1, corresponding to an SNR of 20 dB w.r.t. the original (σ = 1) training data, we applied
BIM for each target label until full confidence was reached. The resulting images are very different:
The model with weight decay, which has a more gradual performance degradation, yields images in
Figure 2(a) that emphasize the edge information relevant to the digit recognition task defined by Y .
Conversely, the patterns for the baseline in Figure 2(b) remain contaminated by noise, and do not
reflect examples that would be identified by a human with high confidence. Indeed, the model with
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Figure 3: Tolerance to (a) deformations produced by “ADef” for misclassification (“miscls”) and
targeting of the least likely label (“ll-tgt”), with accuracy omitted for clarity, and (b) rotations. Models
trained with weight decay denoted by “*”. Solid lines show the MI, dashed lines the prediction
accuracy. In (a), the maximum permitted norm of the deforming vector field acts as a gauge for the
attack strength. In (b), we rotated images by ≤ 30◦, as per [8]; beyond this, a significant fraction of
the informative pixels were rotated out of the frame and digits were far from their natural orientation.
weight decay classifies the images in Figure 2(b) with a mean margin of only 28%, while those of
Figure 2(a) are classified with full confidence by the baseline model.
To summarize the analysis presented in Figure 1: Test accuracy consistently degrades to zero with
increasing attack strength for all adversarial objectives, while the MI does not. This fact reflects
the structure of the learnt clustering of the input space: e.g., class 5 is transformed into an image
resembling a “2” more often than it becomes a “1” or a “7”, indicating that the cluster corresponding
to “5” is closer to cluster “2” than to the others. The more predictable the alternative incorrect
predictions are, the more information I(T ;Y ) is conveyed. Such insights are lost by the accuracy.
Similar trends are observed under spatial attacks, including rotations and deformations, as shown in
Figure 3. Due to the additional digits on the canvas that distract from the center digit for SVHN, we
expect rotations and translations to be legitimately confusing for models trained on this dataset. We
evaluate the model for ±30◦ rotations, as recommended by [8] for 32× 32 images, in Figure 3(b).
Translations must be handled with care again due to the peculiarities of the SVHN dataset, where the
only difference between otherwise identical images that have a different label can be a translation of
just a few pixels.
Finally, we consider attacks capable of producing arbitrary images via deforming vector fields, rather
than Lp norm-based perturbations of the pixels. The deformation algorithm, “ADef” [1], builds on
the first-order DeepFool method [14] to construct smooth deformations through vector fields that
are penalized in terms of the supremum norm. The behaviour observed in the tolerance curves of
Figure 3(a) aligns well with results obtained for perturbation-based attacks, where again, training
with the weight decay constraint is most compelling, and targeted attacks require greater changes to
the input. Several ADef examples and their predictions can be found in Appendix D.
4 Conclusion
We presented a new perspective connecting the adversarial examples problem to fault tolerance —
the property that originally motivated the use of neural networks in performance- and safety-critical
settings. We introduced a simple and intuitive measure for model tolerance: information transmitted
by the model under a given attack strength, which is applicable across a diverse range of realistic
fault models. Adversarial examples show that although modern architectures may have some inherent
tolerance to internal faults, a combination of subtle design principles and a thorough scope of the
intended task are required before they can demonstrate compelling tolerance to input faults.
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Figure 4: Input-fault tolerance in terms of information I(T ;Y ) (solid line) and accuracy (dashed line)
for 1000 random samples from the SVHN test set, as a function of the SNR for the BIM-L∞ method
with three different objectives (see main text for details). As in Figure 1, both models were trained
for 50 epochs with (a) weight decay, and (b) without, with the former being more fault tolerant.
A Additional Detail Regarding the Methodology
It is essential that datasets be prepared identically for model comparison based on the characteristic
I(T ;Y ) vs. SNR curves. As example, presence of a DC offset in the data, which commonly occurs
in natural images due to changes in brightness, will shift the SNR curves if not corrected. We suggest
adopting the zero-mean, unit-variance standard from image processing, which we implement with
per-image mean subtraction in this case for SVHN, after first converting the RGB images to greyscale
via NTSC conversion.
Generally speaking, preprocessing that helps with feature learning also helps confer fault tolerance to
adversarial attacks. Normally one would also want to linearly decorrelate the pixels in the image,
e.g., with ZCA, but we found that the SNR was low enough in many of the SVHN images that this
eliminated low frequency gradient information essential for recognizing the digit.
The adversarial examples literature generally leaves the DC component in the dataset by simply
normalizing inputs to [0, 1], which is attractive from a simplicity perspective, and convenient for
− L∞ threat model comparisons, but we find that this practice itself contributes to adverse model
behaviour, such as excessively large prediction margins for purely white noise patterns.
B Additional Fault Tolerance Curves
In Figure 4 we depict the same set of attacks as in Section 3, but for the L∞ variant of BIM. Although
Figures (a) and (b) appear qualitatively similar, model (a) trained with weight decay is shifted to
the right. By picking SNR values in the range 20–30 and moving upward until intersection with the
curves, we see that the degradation is more gradual in Figure (a).
In Figure 5 we show that curves for the L2-BIM adversary are generally to the left of those for the
L∞-BIM variant. This is expected since the L∞ constraint results in a less efficient adversary for
non-linear models.
C Model Architecture
We use a basic model with four layers, ReLU units, and a Gaussian parameter initialization scheme.
Unless specified otherwise, models were trained for 50 epochs with inverse frequency class weighting,
constant learning rate (1e-2) SGD with the L2 weight decay regularization constant λ set to 1e-2 if
weight decay is used, and a batch size of 128. We summarize this model in Table 1, and respectively
denote h, w, cin, cout, s as convolution kernel height, width, number of input and output channels
w.r.t. each layer, and stride.
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Figure 5: Comparison of BIM-L2 and -L∞ misclassification attacks for models trained with (a)
weight decay and (b) without. The L∞ variant is less efficient for non-linear models, and thus requires
more distortion for a given performance level and is shifted to the right of the L2 method.
Table 1: Fully-convolutional architecture adapted from the CleverHans library tutorials [17], with 32
filters in first layer instead of 64.
Layer h w cin cout s params
Conv1 8 8 1 32 2 2.0k
Conv2 6 6 32 64 2 73.8k
Conv3 5 5 64 64 1 102.4k
Fc 1 1 256 10 1 2.6k
Total – – – – – 180.9k
D Adversarial Examples
In Figure 6 we show additional fooling images initialized from noise of varying σ or power. For a
given value of σ, the model trained with weight decay yields cleaner images with less task-irrelevant
noise.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 6: Adversarial “fooling images” classified by a 100% margin that were initialized from white
Gaussian noise with σ=1e-1, or an SNR of 20dB [(a)–(c)], and 1e-2, or an SNR of 40dB [(b)–(d)]
w.r.t. the original training data. Rows (c) and (d) are for the model whose performance degrades more
gradually, trained with weight decay.
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Figure 7: Targeted adversarial examples obtained after running BIM-L2 for the least number of
iterations sufficient to yield a 91% mean margin. The natural images are enumerated along the
diagonal, with the source digit class enumerated vertically, and the target class horizontally.
In Figure 7 we visualize targeted adversarial examples constructed with the BIM-L2 approach. In
almost all cases, the features of the source digit are manipulated to an extent such that a human
observer would likely agree with the target label.
In Figure 8 we supplement the information curves for adversarial deformations, “ADef”, by showing
qualitative examples, complete with reasonably interpretable deformations. These examples were not
cherry-picked – we arbitrarily sliced a set of ten examples from the test set, and the misclassification
confidence was either low, or in the case where examples were misclassified with high confidence,
they were usually changed into the target class, e.g., an “8” deformed into a legitimate “6”. It is
possible that a different attack, e.g. “stAdv”, may find higher-confidence misclassifications, but these
results are nonetheless encouraging and show how attack success rates (100% in Figure 8) can lead
to a false sense of vulnerability.
E The Test Set “Attack”
Our solution achieving roughly 90.4±0.2% clean test accuracy for the SVHN dataset misses the mark
in terms of state-of-the-art results, e.g., 98.70±0.03% [7].3 It was recently suggested that methods
3Both results averaged over five runs.
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Figure 8: Adversarial deformations constructed with the ADef algorithm, with all incorrect labels as
candidates, and max T -norm=4, for the model with weight decay. Above each image is the predicted
label and prediction margin, defined as the difference between the highest and second-highest softmax
values of the prediction. All deformations are concentrated on the edges of the center digit, which is
the most relevant information in the image w.r.t. the label. An “8” is deformed into a legitimate “6”,
and other instances are in fact ambiguous – e.g., a “1” on a high contrast background could be a “0”
with square edges, and “5” is relatively similar to “6” – and are classified by a suitably small margin.
which increase the error rate on the test set are more vulnerable to a hypothetical “test set attack”,
in which an attacker benefits simply by virtue of typical inputs being misclassified more often [10].
Does such a reduction in test accuracy imply the model is less secure?
Test accuracy is an application-specific constraint, or criteria, which is known during the design
phase. Not only can this be communicated in advance to users of the model, it can also be controlled,
e.g., by collecting more data, as suggested by [23]. Adversarial examples characterize a situation in
which the designer lacks such control for the overwhelming majority of valid inputs, i.e., adversarial
subspaces are not usually rare. Such control can be reclaimed by demonstrating fault-tolerance for
attacks previously unseen to the model.
Although it is obvious that we should avoid unnecessarily limiting test accuracy, in performance-
critical settings we are primarily concerned with behaviour that differs during deployment from that
which was observed during the design phase. A model that cannot achieve sufficiently high accuracy
should not be deployed in a security sensitive application in the first place, whereas high accuracy on
a subset of inputs could lead to a false sense of security, and irrecoverable damages if a product is
deployed prematurely.
It is crucial that we communicate precisely what our model does, i.e., is it expected to recognize
cars, trucks, and animals in general, or only those appearing in a similar context, and at a given
distance from the camera as in a particular database, e.g., the “Tiny Images” [33]. Recent work found
test performance degradations of 4–10% absolute accuracy when natural images were drawn from
the same database [22], such a large discrepancy in claimed versus obtained performance could be
unacceptable in many benign settings, and calls into question the significance of solely numerical
improvements on the state-of-the-art. The outlook is likely less promising for the more general
recognition case.
The old adage “garbage-in, garbage-out” suggests that we should be at least as rigorous in ensuring
models are consistently fed high quality data capable of revealing the intended relationship, as we are
rigorous in our threat models. Predicting “birds” versus “bicycles” with no confident mistakes [3]
could be difficult to learn from finite data without being more specific about the problem, e.g., is
the bird’s whole body in the frame? What is the approximate distance from the camera? Is the bird
facing the camera? Our model is expected to recognize any house number depicted with an Arabic
numeral from a typical “street-view” distance for the given (unknown) lens, and otherwise yield a
low-confidence prediction.
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